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On Doing Things Intentionally
FLORIAN COVA, EMMANUEL DUPOUX AND PIERRE JACOB
Abstract: Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral consider-
ations have an influence on the way we use the adverb ‘intentionally’. Here we propose
our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that
the adverb ‘intentionally’ has three different meanings that are differently selected by
contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can
account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end
by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology.
Introduction
What makes an action intentional and which aspects of an agent’s action can be
achieved intentionally? Philosophical accounts have traditionally emphasized three
factors: foreknowledge, choice and control. For an outcome to be caused intentionally,
the agent must first believe that this outcome has a chance to occur as a result
of his action. The agent must also choose to bring about this outcome. Finally,
the agent must control its occurrence. On this raw canvas, different accounts of
intentional actions can be and have been built. For example, some spell out the
choice condition by requiring the agent to have a desire about the outcome, while
others claim instead that the agent must have the intention to bring about this
outcome. Malle and Knobe (1997) have empirically investigated which factors lay
people consider relevant for intentional action and their results closely match these
models, as people insisted on the five following components: awareness and belief,
desire and intention, and skill. Furthermore, several distinct parameters of an agent’s
action can be achieved intentionally. Of course, if the agent’s action is successful,
then the agent’s goal (to change some existing state of affairs into a new one) will
be achieved intentionally. But as it turns out, the agent’s means for achieving his
goal too can be chosen intentionally or not. Even a side-effect (or a by-product) of
the agent’s action can be achieved intentionally or not.
Recently, some new empirical findings have suggested that considerations other
than the agent’s awareness, belief, desire, intention and skill could play a role in
our ascriptions of intentionality to an agent’s action: namely moral considerations
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(Knobe, 2003a, 2003b). Some have claimed that these experiments show that the
moral valence of an outcome (i.e. of the agent’s bringing about that outcome)
is taken into account when we determine whether it is intentional. Others have
resisted this claim and proposed alternative accounts of these data.
In what follows, we defend a novel account of these empirical findings, inspired
by, and adapted from, Nichols and Ulatowski’s ‘interpretive diversity’ hypothesis
(2007). This account relies on two assumptions: (i) the adverb ‘intentionally’ has
three different, though related, meanings, and (ii) the context (partially) determines
which of the three meanings will be used. Along the way, we argue that our own
view can account for all available data, including data that other accounts so far
have not been able to accommodate, and that it makes new predictions that were
confirmed by experiments that we have run.
In §1, we describe the original experiments that uncovered the phenomenon.
In §2, we survey a category of accounts of this phenomenon according to which
‘intentionally’ can have different meanings and argue that none of them is fully
satisfying. In §3, we present our own account and argue that it succeeds where
others fail. In §§4, 5, 6 and 7, we review the available experimental evidence and
argue that our account can accommodate all of it. Also, we draw new empirical
predictions from our account and put them to test. In §8, we end by discussing the
implications of our theory for folk psychology.
1. Two Puzzles for Intentional Action: The Knobe Effect and the Skill
Effect
Evidence for the putative influence of moral considerations on ascriptions of
intentionality arises from the study of two phenomena, both of which were
discovered by the philosopher Joshua Knobe: the ‘Knobe Effect’ and the ‘Skill
Effect’. In what follows, we describe Knobe’s original experiments that lead to the
discovery of these two puzzles.
1.1 The Knobe Effect
The Knobe Effect can be described as the observation that whether a side-effect is
considered intentional depends on the moral valence of this side-effect. Consider
the following scenario (Knobe, 2003a):
Harm Case: The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the
board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us
increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.’ The chairman of the
board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want
to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started the
new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.
In his original study, Knobe found that 82% of the people surveyed answered
‘yes’ to the question, ‘did the chairman of the board intentionally harm the
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environment?’ When given the same vignette, but this time with the word
‘harm’ changed into ‘help’ (the Help Case), only 23% responded positively when
asked if the chairman of the board intentionally helped the environment. This
striking asymmetry has since been replicated in other languages and cultures
(Knobe and Burra, 2006), in young children (Leslie et al., 2006; Pellizzoni et al.,
2009), in people suffering from Asperger Syndrome (Zalla and Machery, ms)
and in patients with cerebral lesions to the prefrontal cortex (Young et al.,
2006). More recently, it has been shown that the means whereby an agent
achieves her goal exhibit asymmetries similar to the Knobe Effect (Cova and Naar,
forthcoming a).
1.2 The Skill Effect
The other phenomenon, the Skill Effect, can be described as the fact that moral con-
siderations modulate the impact of the ‘skill’ factor on ascriptions of intentionality.
Consider the following scenario:
Bull’s-eye (Skill): Jake desperately wants to win the rifle contest. He knows that
he will only win the contest if he hits the bull’s-eye. He raises the rifle, gets the
bull’s-eye in the sights, and presses the trigger.
Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady. The gun is aimed
perfectly . . . The bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye. Jake wins the contest.
In this case, 79% of participants answered that Jake intentionally hit the bull’s-eye.
Now, consider the Bull’s-eye (No-Skill) case in which the second paragraph is
modified:
But Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the
gun, and the shot goes wild . . . Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly on the
bull’s-eye. Jake wins the contest.
In this case, only 28% of participants answered that Jake intentionally hit the
bull’s-eye. These results show that ascriptions of intentionality also depend on the
degree of control the agent exerts on his action. But now consider the following
pair of scenarios:
Aunt (Skill): Jake desperately wants to have more money. He knows that he will
inherit a lot of money when his aunt dies. One day, he sees his aunt walking
by the window. He raises his rifle, gets her in the sights, and presses the trigger.
Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady. The gun is aimed
perfectly . . . The bullet hits her directly in the heart. She dies instantly.
Aunt (No-Skill): [ . . . ] But Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips
on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild . . . Nonetheless, the bullet hits
her directly in the heart. She dies instantly.
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In the Skill condition, 95% of participants answered that Jake intentionally killed
his aunt. 76% did so in the No-Skill condition. Once again, the outcome is
perceived as less intentional when the agent exerts less control. But this difference
is much smaller in this case (19%) than in the Bull’s-eye pair (51%). Moreover,
in the Bull’s-eye (No-Skill) case, most participants consider hitting the bull’s eye as
not intentional, whereas most participants consider killing the aunt intentional in
the Aunt (No-Skill) case. These results suggest that the contribution of control to
ascriptions of intentionality is greatly diminished when the outcome is morally bad.
Another experiment by Knobe suggests that it is also diminished when the outcome
is a morally good one (Knobe, 2003b).
These two sets of experiments suggest that moral considerations can (i) play a role
in our ascriptions of intentionality and (ii) modulate the extent to which the control
factor has an impact on these ascriptions. In the following section, we distinguish
two main kinds of accounts of the Knobe Effect (which has been at the center of
most theoretical attempts so far, at the expense of the Skill Effect) and motivate our
preference for one particular kind of accounts.
2. Pluralist Accounts of the Knobe Effect: A Critical Survey
Many accounts have been proposed of these phenomena (particularly of the Knobe
Effect). These accounts can be roughly grouped into two categories: monist and
pluralist accounts. Monist accounts consider that there is one folk concept of
intentional action and that the effects we described must be accounted for either
as a consequence of this concept (e.g. Knobe, 2006; Sripada, 2010; Sripada and
Konrath, 2011) or as a consequence of biases, rules or heuristics that interfere with
the application of this concept (e.g. Adams and Steadman, 2004a, 2004b, 2007;
Nadelhoffer, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Wright and Bengson, 2009). Pluralist accounts
claim that the adverb ‘intentionally’ can have more than one meaning or expresses
more than one concept, and that asymmetries must be understood as a consequence
of this semantic plurality. In this section, we describe the existing pluralist accounts
and explain why, although they are not satisfactory, we think they are nonetheless
on the right tracks.
2.1 Nichols and Ulatowski’s ‘Interpretive Diversity’ Hypothesis
Nichols and Ulatowksi were the first to propose that ‘intentionally’ could have
different meanings. According to Nichols and Ulatowski’s ‘interpretive diversity’
hypothesis, people actually ascribe two different meanings to the noun phrase
‘intentional action’: (i) ‘having a motive’ and (ii) ‘having foreknowledge’. Further-
more, one and the same person can adopt one or the other according to the context.
In the Harm Case, when they use ‘intentionally’, most people mean ‘done with
foreknowledge’ and they judge the chairman as having harmed the environment
‘intentionally’ (because he knew his action would harm the environment). But,
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in the Help Case, when they use ‘intentionally’, most people mean ‘done with a
motive’ and they consider the chairman as not having helped the environment
‘intentionally’ (because he lacked a motive for helping the environment).
The first problem for Nichols and Ulatowski’s account is that they do not
propose hypotheses about the factors that select one of the two meanings rather
than the other. It is not sufficient to be told that a word has two meanings, because
if true, this does not tell us which of the two meanings a speaker has in mind in
a particular use of the word. Furthemore, as an account of the Knobe effect, their
approach is, at best, incomplete since it doesn’t allow precise predictions for other
cases. Nevertheless, one could argue that this doesn’t prove that their approach is
unable to explain the Knobe effect, just that it needs further precision. But we think
that there are cases that it can’t accommodate, whatever these specifications are.
Let’s begin with the ‘foreknowledge’ interpretation: does it mean that the agent
must be certain that a given outcome will occur? Or does it only mean that he
must be conscious that this outcome has a chance (even a slight one) to occur as
a result of his action? We think that Nichols and Ulatowski have to adopt the
second solution in order to accommodate the following data: we gave 20 subjects
a version of the Harm Case in which the chairman is told that the program has only
a 10% chance of harming the environment. Against the odds, the program ends
up harming the environment. In this case, most subjects judged that the chairman
intentionally harmed the environment. So, consciousness of a small chance for an
event to occur should be enough for the ‘foreknowledge’ meaning. But, if this is
the case, then Nichols and Ulatowski’s account cannot explain why people judge
that the agent did not intentionally hit the bull’s-eye in the Bull’s-eye (No-Skill) case.
According to the ‘motive’ interpretation, his action should be judged intentional,
since he had the desire to hit the bull’s-eye. But it should also be judged intentional
according to the ‘foreknowledge’ interpretation, since the agent is conscious that
there is a chance (even small) that he hits the bull’s-eye. So, Nichols and Ulatowski
cannot explain why people judge that hitting the bull’s-eye is not intentional in this
case.
It could be answered that Nichols and Ulatowski’s account was only aimed at
explaining subjects’ answers in the case of side-effects, and that it is unfair to dismiss
it on the basis of results drawn from researches on the Skill Effect. Fair enough! But
Nichols and Ulatowski also have troubles with judgments of intentionality in the
case of side-effects. Let’s consider the following case (inspired by Nanay, 2010):
Apple Tree: A company has decided to expand its building. The vice-president
of the company has been assigned the task to prepare the building’s new
plans. Once the plan is finished, the vice-president goes to submit them to
the chairman of the board. On his way, he thinks, ‘The chairman will surely
be happy. Expanding our building will increase our profits. Moreover, to start
the expansion, it will be necessary to cut down the apple tree in front of the
chairman’s window. The chairman has always hated this tree that has annoyed
him ever since he moved into this office. That’s what he told me many times.’
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The vice-president submits the plans to the chairman, ‘Expanding the
building will help us increase profits. Moreover, to expand our building, we
will need to cut down the apple tree that is in front of your office.’ The
chairman answers, ‘So what? Although that apple tree has annoyed me ever
since I moved into this office, I don’t care at all about its being cut down. All I
care about is making profits. Start the expansion.’
They started the expansion and the apple tree was removed.
We gave this case to 34 subjects and asked on seven-point scales (i) whether the
chairman intentionally had the apple tree cut down (on a 7-point scale ranging
from −3 = ‘NO’ to 3 = ‘YES’) and (ii) how much the chairman wanted to have
the apple tree cut down (on a 7-point scale ranging from −3 = ‘he didn’t want
to’ to 3 = ‘he really wanted to’, 0 being ‘he didn’t care’). The results showed that
participants tended to consider that the chairman did not intentionally have the
apple tree cut down (M=−0.62, with only 29% of subjects giving a answer superior
to 0) but tended to consider that he wanted to have the apple tree cut down
(M=0.90, with 57% of subjects giving a answer superior to 0). So, we have a case in
which most subjects judge that (i) the agent desired the outcome, (ii) the agent had
foreknowledge of the outcome (since this is explicitly told in the scenario) and yet
(iii) the agent did not intentionally bring about this outcome: these results suggest
that the two meanings described by Nichols and Ulatowski do not exhaust our use
of the word ‘intentionally’.
2.2 Cushman and Mele
Cushman and Mele (2008) have defended a somewhat similar (but more pre-
cise) hypothesis, according to which, when ascribing intentionality, (i) all people
consider ‘having a desire’ as a sufficient condition, (ii) only about 20% consider
‘foreknowledge’ as a sufficient condition in general, and (iii) most people consider
that, nevertheless, ‘foreknowledge’ can be a sufficient condition in the case of bad
actions. Nevertheless, this hypothesis cannot account for certain cases,1 such as the
following (drawn from Mele and Cushman, 2007):
1 Take for example the Apple Tree case: in this case, the agent knows that the apple tree will be
cut down (there is ‘foreknowledge’) and people tend to say that the agent desires the tree to
be cut down (there is ‘desire’). So, we should expect people to tend to say that the chairman
intentionally had the apple tree cut down—which is not the case. One could reply that the
agent’s desire in this case is not strong enough. But, even so, there is still a problem: there is
a second version of the Apple Tree case, in which the agent is portrayed as having a long-time
relationship with the tree. In this case, people tend to say he didn’t desire to have the tree
cut down. Still, they tend to say he intentionally had the tree cut down (Cova and Naar,
forthcoming b). So, we have here a case in which we have an intentional action without
desire, and without the side effect being a bad one (since, if having the tree cut down was
a bad side effect, ‘foreknowledge’ would be a sufficient condition, and Cushman and Mele
should expect high intentionality ratings in both Apple Tree cases).
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Pond: Al said to Ann: ‘You know, if you fill in that pond in the empty lot
next to your house, you’re going to make the kids who look for frogs there
sad.’ Ann replied: ‘I know that I’ll make those kids sad. I like those kids, and
I’ll definitely regret making them sad. But the pond is a breeding ground for
mosquitoes; and because I own the lot, I am responsible for it. It must be filled
in.’ Ann filled in the pond, and, sure enough, the kids were sad. Did Ann
intentionally make the kids sad?
Participants had to answer the question using a scale from 1 (‘no’) to 7 (‘yes’). The
mean intentionality rating was 3.19 (with only 28% saying ‘yes’). So, in this case,
most people judged unintentional a side-effect that was (i) bad and (ii) foreseen2,
in contradiction with Mele and Cushman’s account that would predict that, in this
case (involving a bad action, ‘making the kids sad’), most people would consider
‘foreknowledge’ as a sufficient action, and would judge that Ann intentionally made
the kids sad.
2.3 Sousa and Holbrook
In a more recent study, Sousa and Holbrook (2010) have proposed an account of
the Skill Effect that relies on a distinction between two folk concepts of intentional
action: according to the ‘simple concept’ of intentional action, it is sufficient to
do something with the intention to do it intentionally, while, according to the
‘composite concept’ of intentional action, intention is a necessary but insufficient
condition. It must be supplemented with other conditions such as the fact that
the outcome was brought about following the agent’s plan, and on the basis of
a reliable capacity. Sousa and Holbrook’s hypothesis is that blameworthy actions
(such as murder) make the ‘simple concept’ more salient. When the agent tries to
hit a bull’s-eye, both concepts are equally salient, and a certain number of subjects
take into account whether the agent succeeded by sheer luck and on the basis of a
reliable capacity, leading to a difference between the Bull’s-eye (Skill) and Bull’s-eye
(No-Skill) cases. But, when the agent tries to murder his aunt, the simple concept
is the most salient, leading most subjects to take into account only the agent’s
intention, and reducing to almost nothing the difference between the Aunt (Skill)
and the Aunt (No-Skill) cases.
2 One might say that, in the Pond case, the side effect is not really ‘bad’. First, notice that
Cushman and Mele (2007) explicitly designed this case as involving a ‘bad side-effect’. Second,
even if we focus here on the Pond case, it is not unique. Phelan and Sarkissian (2008) designed
a similar puzzling scenario (City Planner) in which a city planner starts a plan that will clean up
the toxic waste polluting a former industrial area but will also increase the level of joblessness.
Only 29% of participants considered that the city planner intentionally increased the level of
joblessness. Lanteri (2009) used another scenario (Lever) in which a trolley is diverted in order
to save five people, causing the death of a sixth person as a side effect. In this case, only
29% of participants answered that killing the person was intentional. These cases (‘increasing
joblessness’ and ‘killing a person’) are clear cases of morally bad actions.
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Though Sousa and Holbrook succeed in explaining the Skill Effect, they
acknowledge that their account can’t be applied to the Knobe Effect: the chairman’s
harming the environment would be unintentional according to both the simple and
the composite concepts. As one can see, none of these hypotheses can at the same
time explain the Knobe Effect and the Skill Effect. So, there’s no existing pluralist
account that can claim to be a complete theory of our use of ‘intentionally’ and our
ascriptions of intentionality. Nevertheless, we think that these theories are on the
right track when they claim that ‘intentionally’ is a polysemous word and that this
polysemy is the source of the Knobe and the Skill Effects. The first reason is that
informal observations and reports show that, when tested, people often ask what we,
experimentalists, mean by ‘intentionally’ and start to argue with one another about
the meaning of this word once the experiment is over.3 This strongly suggests that
‘intentionally’ can be understood in different ways. Nichols and Ulatowski’s and
Sousa and Holbrook’s studies have confirmed these informal observations through
controlled experiments by showing that the kind of justifications people give to
their intentionality judgments can greatly differ according to the case they have
been considering. This fluctuation in the criteria people use (or claim to use) to
attribute intentionality probably reflects changes in the concept of intentional action
that is used.
A second reason is that, in accordance with people’s changing justifications,
criteria that matter for intentional action in one experiment can fail to have any
impact on ascriptions of intentionality in another set up. The Skill effect is a good
example (with the ‘control’ condition being a condition for intentional action in
one case but not in another), but it is not the only one. Let’s consider for example
the subjective probability of success—that is the probability assigned by the agent
to his successfully achieving a certain outcome. In some cases, this probability seems
to matter. Consider for example Nadelhoffer’s C1, C2, C3 and C4 cases (2006c). In
these cases, a hunter kills a deer to win a hunting competition but, as a side-effect,
he also hits and kills a bird-watcher. Among the cases, Nadelhoffer varied the
probability that the hunter ascribes to his killing the bird-watcher. The smaller the
probability, the less intentionality participants ascribed to the hunter’s killing of the
bird-watcher. So, we would be inclined to think that subjective probabilities matter
for intentional action. But let’s now consider the following case (drawn from Mele
and Cushman, 2007):
Bowl: Earl is an excellent and powerful bowler. His friends tell him that the
bowling pins on lane 12 are special 200-pound metal pins disguised to look like
3 In pilot studies for experiments reported in this article, we tested groups of friends in
universities. Each one of them answered separately, but, once the survey was filled, they would
often ask each other what their answer was. More than once, this started a dispute about what
‘intentionally’ really means: some would argue that ‘intention’ was necessary for something to
be done intentionally, while others would claim that it wasn’t.
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normal pins for the purposes of a certain practical joke. They also tell him that
it is very unlikely that a bowled ball can knock over such pins. Apparently as
an afterthought, they challenge Earl to knock over the pins on lane 12 with a
bowled ball and offer him ten dollars for doing so. Earl believes that his chance
of knocking over the pins on lane 12 is very slim, but he wants to knock them
down very much. He rolls an old bowling ball as hard as he can at the pins,
hoping that he will knock down at least one. To his great surprise, he knocks
them all down! The joke, it turns out, was on Earl: the pins on lane 12 were
normal wooden ones. Did Earl intentionally knock down the pins?
On a scale from 1 (not intentional) to 7 (intentional), participants gave a mean
answer of 6.36 (that is, very intentional). But, in this case, Earl believes that it is
very unlikely that he will succeed in knocking down the pins (he ascribes very low
subjective probabilities). Still, most participants rate his action as intentional.
So, from one case to another, not only do people explicitly give different criteria
for intentional action, but also they are sensitive to different factors. We take this as
a strong motivation for a pluralist account: the fact that ascriptions of intentionality
depend on so many factors is evidence that ‘intentionally’ has several meanings. All
we now need is a theory that can (i) specify the different meanings of ‘intentionally’,
(ii) tell how different contexts preferentially elicit each of these meanings and (iii)
accommodate all the existing data. In the following section, we advance a tentative
hypothesis that could fulfill all three requirements.
3. Revisiting the ‘Interpretive Diversity’ hypothesis
In this section, we introduce our account of the Knobe and Skill Effects and argue
that it accommodates all the cases we have encountered so far. Our new account
can be considered as belonging to the class of pluralist accounts, since it claims
that ‘intentionally’ has various meanings that are differently elicited depending on
which features of the case are emphasized.
3.1 General Presentation
If ‘intentionally’ has various meanings, which are they? One meaning seems
straightforward: to do x intentionally, you must ‘aim at x’ or ‘intend to do x’,
that is, do x because you want x to occur. The relevant notion of intention here
is arguably what philosophers have called prior intention (as opposed to intention
in action).4 An agent’s prior intention is closely linked to her desire. You must be
motivated to engage in an action whose outcome will be x. For example, in order
to understand an agent’s action in a given context, one must identify the agent’s
prior intention: the very same hand movement can be recruited by an agent whose
4 Cf. Searle, 1983; Bratman, 1987; Pacherie, 2000.
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prior intention (or desire) is to frighten a bird, to greet an invitee or to wave
good-bye to a departing host guest. This is roughly the definition given by many
dictionaries.5 Let’s call this first meaning the conative meaning of ‘intentionally’.
This conative meaning is close to the ‘desire’ meaning hypothesized by Nichols and
Ulatowski’s and Sousa and Holbrook’s ‘simple concept’ of intentional action.
Now, it is necessary that an agent’s act arises from some desire or other, but it is
not sufficient for the agent’s action to count as intentional. Consider a puppet on a
stage, whose intentionality entirely derives from the intentionality of another agent
and whose movements are fully guided by another’s intentions and desires. Clearly
this puppet cannot be said to be acting intentionally because it lacks the relevant
intentions and desires. Now consider an agent with her own non-derived intentions
and desires, but who is acting under the coercion of another agent whose desires and
intentions are being manipulatively induced by an evil neuroscientist, or whose life
is being threatened, or who is being blackmailed. In this case, the agent is acting out
of her own intentions and desires: she does not have some weird desire implanted
in her brain by an evil neuroscientist; or she genuinely wants to save her life or the
life of her beloved. But she is not really acting intentionally because the intentions
and desires on the basis of which she acts were not formed autonomously: they were
forced onto her, i.e. they were formed under some constraint or coercion. If so,
then acting intentionally requires the agent’s action to flow from intentions and
desires that she agent autonomously (or freely) formed. Let’s call this the autonomy
meaning of ‘intentionally’.
Finally, in addition to having autonomous desires and prior intentions, an agent
who engages in a particular action must select a particular motor sequence (or
behavior) that she thinks is her best means of fulfilling her desire or prior intention,
given the environmental constraints that she faces. This is roughly what philosophers
call an intention in action or a motor intention. For example, if an agent’s prior intention
(or desire) is to turn on the light, then she must either form the motor intention
to press a switch or else form the communicative intention to ask another to turn
on the light. Furthermore, the environmental constraints faced by the agent may
change in the course of the agent’s action. If the environmental constraints vary, the
agent of an intentional action must be able to perceive the changes and to adapt her
behavior to the changes in order to fulfill her prior intention or desire to achieve
a particular outcome. What matters to the intentionality of the agent’s action is
the ability of the agent to vary its behavior in accordance with the changes of the
environmental constraints.6 Unless the agent exhibits this behavioral variability in
response to environmental changes, her behavior will be judged purely accidental,
5 For example, the Cambridge Dictionary Online defines an ‘intentional action’ as an action that
was ‘intended or planned’.
6 Developmental psychologists have emphasized the importance of what Biro et al. (2007), Biro
and Leslie (2007) and Csibra (2008) call equifinal variations of behavior as a cue that shapes the
interpretation by preverbal human infants of an agent’s movements as goal-directed.
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i.e. she will have achieved a given outcome (if she does) by sheer luck. Let us call
this sense of ‘intentionally’ the control sense.7
In accordance with these semantic and pragmatic observations, we hypothesize
that ‘intentionally’ can have three different meanings, which can be selectively
foregrounded by the context:
i. First (conative) meaning: asking whether A did x intentionally amounts to
asking whether A had the desire to bring x about;
ii. Second (autonomy) meaning: ‘intentionally’ is to be understood by contrast
with ‘unwillingly’, so that asking whether A did x intentionally amounts to
wondering whether A was forced or coerced into doing x;
iii. Third (control) meaning: ‘intentionally’ is to be understood by contrast with
‘accidentally’ or ‘by sheer luck’, so that asking whether A did x intentionally
amounts to wondering whether A had control over the occurrence of x or
whether A succeeded by sheer luck.
On the basis of a given scenario, subjects form expectations about an agent’s
psychological attitudes and character. Thus, when they interpret the intentionality-
question that they must answer, subjects pick out one of these three meanings on
the basis of their expectations about the agent’s psychology. In the next sections,
we give a more accurate description of this hypothesis and apply it to the different
cases we surveyed.
3.2 Descriptions of the Three Meanings
All three meanings share some requirements that an event must fulfill if it is to be
considered intentional. These requirements are the following:
i. The event must originate in an action that was directed by an intention in
action (that is, a goal-directed action, not just a reflex);8
7 Each of the three meanings of ‘intentionally’ has specific antonyms. First, if one causes an effect
carelessly or recklessly, one causes it in violation of the conative sense of ‘intentionally’ (because
this effect was not what the agent wanted to achieve). Secondly, if one causes an effect unwillingly
(i.e. against one’s own will), one causes it in violation of the autonomy sense of ‘intentionally’.
(Arguably, to cause an effect unwillingly is not just to cause it without wanting to, i.e. carelessly
or recklessly, but also to cause it while wanting not to cause it.) Finally, if one causes an effect
accidentally (or by luck), one causes it in violation of the control sense of ‘intentionally’. In
accordance with the conative meaning, various Google searches returned 37,900 results for
‘intentionally or carelessly’ and 1,150,000 results for ‘intentionally or recklessly’. In accordance
with the autonomy meaning, we found 2,300 results for ‘intentionally or by necessity’, 3,340
for ‘intentionally or reluctantly’, 12,000 results for ‘intentionally or unwillingly’, 69,800 for
‘intentionally of forced’ and 213,000 for ‘intentionally of by force’. Finally, in accordance with
the control meaning, a Google search of ‘intentionally or accidentally’ returned 908,000 results
(plus 146,000 results for ‘intentionally or by accident’).
8 In Mele and Cushman’s Weed case (2007), a person named Jen drives to the hardware store to
buy weed spray and get rid of weeds when she loses control of her car and ends up crushing
the weeds. In this case, most people considered her eliminating the weeds as not intentional.
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ii. The event must originate in an action the agent consciously planned (not
an action performed out of pure habit);9
iii. The agent either (i) specifically tried to bring about the event or (ii) knew
that the event had a non-zero chance to happen.10
In light of these necessary conditions, we propose the three following different
meanings for ‘intentionally’:
i. Meaning 1: an event is intentional if the agent’s desire for the occurrence of
the event turns out to be at least as strong as (or stronger than) we expected
it to be.11
ii. Meaning 2: an event is intentional if the agent is less reluctant to bring about the
event that we would expect him to be.
iii. Meaning 3: an event is intentional if the agent brought about this event, not
by sheer luck, but by exerting control upon its occurrence.
Notice that our hypotheses are in agreement with traditional accounts of intentional
action: whereas foreknowledge is a necessary condition for all three meanings, choice
(under the form of ‘desiring to’ and ‘not being reluctant to’) is at the core or
Meanings 1 and 2, and control is at the heart of Meaning 3. So, our hypotheses
highlight the very same parameters as traditional accounts.
3.3 Eliciting Features
Now, we must specify which features of the scenario will lead people to favor one
meaning over the others. We think there are two main eliciting factors: (i) which
desire the agent can be expected to have and (ii) the possibility of failure (of the
agent’s action).
Let’s start with expectations. There are two different kinds of expectations:
normative and descriptive. When we normatively expect A to x, we mean that A
should morally x.12 When we descriptively expect A to x, we attribute a high probability
to A’s x-ing. In the following, when we use the word ‘expectation’, we mean both
types of expectations.
9 In Mele and Cushman’s Drive case (2007), a man drives home by habit, though he had
originally planned to go to his favorite store. In this case, only 28% of participants answered
that he intentionally drove home.
10 The agent’s foreknowledge can be very elusive. For experiments on this precise topic, see
Pellizzoni et al., 2010.
11 Here and in the rest of the article, by ‘desire’ we mean a very broad and general kind of
pro-attitude. Note that we don’t propose a ‘pure desire’ account of intentional action: we don’t
claim that ‘desire’ is a sufficient condition for intentional action, since it must be accompanied
by foreknowledge and furthermore the outcome must be the result of an intention in action.
Also note that the relevant desire is the one that actually explains the agent’s behavior.
12 Normative expectations can also be described as what we believe a morally reasonable agent
would desire in a given context.
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The second relevant feature is the possibility of failure. Some actions appear to us
as more likely to fail than others: for example, ringing the doorbell typically seems
to us less likely to fail than hitting a distant target with an arrow. There is less room
for failure in the first than in the second case and we consider that, in the second
case, success depends on a particular skill.
These two kinds of features guide the choice of the relevant meaning of
‘intentionally’ when subjects are faced with vignettes (the context) and asked
whether the agent acted intentionally. Why? Remember that subjects have (or
think they have) to determine what the experimenter wants to know (and thus
means by ‘intentionally’). Thus, it is likely that their ‘deduction’ of the appropriate
meaning of ‘intentionally’ will be oriented by the content of the vignette and by
what they think the more interesting question is in the current context. Thus we
make the following predictions:
• If we are led by the context to expect agent A to have the desire to bring
about event x, then Meaning 1 will be preferentially elicited. Indeed, if we
normatively expect A to have the desire that x, then the more interesting
question will be whether he fulfilled this expectation. And if A is descriptively
expected to desire x, then we will wonder whether our expectation was
correct.
• If we are led to expect agent A to be reluctant to bring about event x, then
Meaning 2 will be preferentially elicited. Indeed, if we normatively expect A
to be reluctant to x, then the more interesting question will be whether he
fulfilled this expectation. And if A is descriptively expected to be reluctant
to x, then we will wonder whether our expectation was correct.
• If there was a serious possibility that A failed to cause x, then Meaning 3 will
be elicited, because we will wonder whether A’s success was due to sheer
luck or to A’s control over his action.
Of course, this is far too simple: there are cases in which these rules lead to the
prediction that all three meanings will be elicited. Imagine the case of a psychopath
with sniper skills who intentionally shoots an innocent person in the head at a
great distance. Suppose we ask: ‘did the psychopath intentionally kill the person?’
In this case, all three meanings will be elicited because (i) we descriptively expect
our psychopath to have the desire to kill a person, (ii) we normatively expect him
to be reluctant to kill a person and (iii) hitting a target at a great distance requires
either skill or luck and there is a serious possibility of failure.13
Arguably, there is no algorithm that would allow us to predict for each case
which meaning will be the most salient. Saliency is a contextual matter: which
meaning will be chosen depends on which feature is made salient by the context.
13 In this particular case, our account predicts that our psychopath killed the person intentionally
according to the three meanings, and thus that people would overwhelmingly answer ‘yes’ to
the question: ‘did the psychopath intentionally killed the person?’
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Furthermore, our expectations about, e.g., the strength of an agent’s desire are
shaped by of all the relevant contextual information about the agent’s psychology.
For example, imagine a scenario in which an agent, who has been described as
ambivalent or even indifferent about money but who nonetheless decides to pick
up a five Euros bill which he has just seen on the ground. We are likely to judge
that he intentionally picked up the money. This might seem like a problem for
our account of meaning 1. But it is not. Our judgment is the result of our ability
to make interpretive adaptations in response to incoming information. After being
told that the agent is indifferent about money, we expected him to care less about
money than most people. Now, we learn that he picked up a five Euros bill on the
ground. To make sense of the agent’s novel action, in the light of our background
expectations about him, we ascribe to him a desire for this bill, on this occasion,
which is stronger than the desire we would have ascribed to him on the basis of
the background description of his overall attitude towards money alone. This is in
accordance with our account of Meaning 1.14
However, there are some general principles of interpretation:
• Standard pragmatic assumption: The more a scenario highlights a feature, the
more this feature is salient.
• Priority of normative expectations: ceteris paribus, normative expectations are
more salient than other features.
The first principle is quite evident: the more you draw the subject’s attention to
a particular feature, the more this feature becomes salient. The second principle is
less evident but can be justified in different ways. A priori, it is likely that moral
features are salient to moralizing creatures like us: we are fast and skilled in detecting
violations of normative expectations. A posteriori, the Skill effect shows that, when
moral expectations are present, other features (like control) tend to be overlooked.
Furthermore, the second principle can also be further illustrated by a case that
might seem to threaten our account of meaning 2 of ‘intentionally’. Suppose that
we learn (from a historian) that Stalin actually had regrets about sending so many
people to the Gulag. Surely, we would be surprised: we wouldn’t have expected
Stalin to feel regret. Thus, it would show that Stalin was more reluctant to send
people to the Gulag than we expected him to be on the basis of what we knew
about him. However, we wouldn’t say that he didn’t do it intentionally. It may
seem as if, in light of Stalin’s regret, our judgment of intentionality is in violation
of our account of meaning 2. But it is not. We are surprised by Stalin’s regret in
light of our descriptive expectations about Stalin’s psychology. But if we compare
Stalin’s attitudes to what we would normatively expect from other people, we would
conclude that his reluctance to engage in this action was not strong enough to
prevent him from performing it, since he actually did it. So, from a normative point
14 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal for raising such a case.
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of view, Stalin was less reluctant than we expected him to be—and this warrants our
ascription of intentionality. In accordance with the second principle, this example
also highlights the fact that, in cases of morally bad actions, our judgments are
shaped by normative, rather than descriptive, expectations.15
Of course, these meanings and principles are only tentative hypotheses that
cannot be fully justified independently from the data. Nevertheless, we will show
that they are successful in accounting for the data that have been collected so far,
and this success is the main reason why we should accept them.
3.4 Accounting for the Data
So, can our hypotheses account for all the different cases described so far? Let
us begin with the original Knobe Effect. In the Harm Case, the chairman is
(normatively) expected to be reluctant to harm the environment: thus, Meaning
2 is preferentially elicited. But, because the chairman does not care about the
environment, he is much less reluctant to harm the environment that we would
normatively expect him to be. So, harming the environment is intentional. In the
Help Case, the chairman is (normatively) expected to have the desire to help the
environment: Meaning 1 is elicited. But, the chairman does not have the desire
to help the environment as much as we would expect him to. So, helping the
environment is not intentional.
In the Apple Tree case, we are told that the apple tree annoys the chairman, so
we (descriptively) expect him to have the desire to get rid of the tree (which elicits
Meaning 1). But he claims not to care and so does not seem to really have the
desire to get rid of the tree: thus, getting rid of the tree is not intentional, because
the chairman’s desire to get rid of the tree is not as great as we expected.
In the Pond case, making the kids sad is something we (normatively) expect
Ann to be reluctant to do. So, Meaning 2 is elicited. But the case portrays Ann
as reluctant to make the kids sad: she does so only because she is forced to.
Because she has a good reason to act, most people judge that, although she finally
decides to act, she does so reluctantly enough. So, making the kids sad is not
intentional.
Finally, our hypotheses can account for the Skill Effect. In the two Bull’s-eye
cases, there is a descriptive expectation (Jack wants to win the contest) and a serious
possibility of failure (hitting the bull’s-eye requires skill). But much of the scenario
focuses on Jack’s aiming at the bull’s-eye and trying to hit it, while Jack’s desire
to win the contest is quickly mentioned in the first sentence of the scenario. So,
Meaning 1 is not really salient while Meaning 3 is strongly elicited. This is why the
main factor that drives attributions of intentionality is the amount of control Jake
exerts on his action. In the Skill condition, Jack exerts much control on his action:
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helping us to better link our account of Meaning
2 and our second general tentative principle of interpretation.
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thus, it is intentional. In the No-Skill condition, on the contrary, Jake succeeds only
by sheer luck: thus, it is not intentional.
In the two Aunt cases, the outcome (killing his aunt) raises very strong normative
expectations (we normatively expect Jake to be reluctant to kill his aunt) and it is
mentioned in several places (it is the object of Jack’s desire, it constitutes the end
of the scenario and it is part of the content of the question). So, Meaning 2 is
preferentially elicited. What is most important is not the amount of control exerted
by Jack; it is Jack’s desires. As in both cases Jack is not reluctant to kill his aunt,
killing his aunt is intentional in both cases. Nevertheless, a small difference remains
between the two cases because a small number of subjects are using Meaning 3 and
are sensitive to differences in control.
So, our hypotheses can account for the data just surveyed. In the following
sections, we argue that the explanatory power of our hypotheses is strong enough
to account for most of the experimental literature on the use of ‘intentionally’. For
each of our three meanings, we will describe the empirical predictions that can be
derived and search for empirical data that confirm or disconfirm these hypotheses.
Where no data were available, we ran our own experiments.
4. Empirical Predictions Related to Meaning 1
In this section, we describe the empirical predictions that can be derived from the
hypothesis that people use ‘intentionally’ with the first meaning (‘having the desire
to’) in cases in which the intentionality question bears on an outcome about which
we would expect the agent to have a desire.
4.1 Immunity to Changes in Objective and Subjective Control
Let us first call ‘objective control’ the control that the agent exerts on his action and
‘subjective control’ the control that the agent believes himself to be able to exert on
his action. If the agent brings about outcome x with low objective control and/or
low subjective control, does this make this outcome less intentional on Meaning
1? Clearly, it should not: having (or believing to have) low control upon his action
doesn’t reduce the agent’s desire to x. So, we should expect decreases in objective
and subjective control not to have any effect on people’s use of ‘intentionally’ when
they use Meaning 1. Here is a scenario drawn from the literature (Nadelhoffer,
2005):
Nuclear (Good): A nuclear reactor is in danger of exploding. Fred knows that
its exploding can only be prevented by shutting it down, and that it can be
shut down only by punching a certain ten-digit code into a certain computer.
Fred is alone in the control room. Although he knows which computer to
use, he has no idea what the code is. Fred needs to think fast. He decides
that it would be better to type in ten digits than to do nothing. Vividly
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aware that the odds against typing in the correct code are astronomical, Fred
decides to give it a try. He punches in the first ten digits that come into
his head, in that order, believing of his doing so that it ‘might thereby’ shut
down the reactor and prevent the explosion. Amazingly, he punches in the
correct code, thereby preventing a nuclear explosion and saving thousands of
people.
In this case, 73% of participants said that Fred intentionally prevented the explosion
(a morally good event that we would expect the agent to have a strong desire to
cause). Our hypothesis can account for this result if we suppose that most (but
obviously not all) participants have adopted Meaning 1.
4.2 Making Morally Good Side-effects Intentional
Our hypothesis also makes the prediction that a morally good side-effect can be
intentional if the agent genuinely has the desire that it occurs. Wible (2009) used a
case similar to the Help Case, but in which the chairman answered: ‘Great! I care
about helping the environment. I am happy that we can help the environment
and make a profit at the same time. Let’s start the new program.’ In this case,
55% of participants thought the chairman intentionally helped the environment,
which is higher than in the original Help Case. Nevertheless, 55% is not that high.
One possibility is that, in this case, most participants do not really believe that the
chairman genuinely cares about the environment but that he thinks that helping
the environment will improve his reputation. (For similar results, see Guglielmo
and Malle, 2010.)
To address this concern, we designed the following scenario on the model of the
Help Case:
Very Nice Chairman: The vice-president of a company goes to the chairman of
the board and says: ‘You asked us to imagine new programs that would enable
us to make more money. We can propose two programs. Program A will enable
us to make a lot of money for a very small cost. Program B will generate as
much money as Program A for the same cost, but will have the supplementary
effect of helping the environment. Nevertheless, it will be impossible to prove
that it is our action that helped the environment, and that won’t help our
reputation. What program do you want us to start?’ The chairman of the board
answers: ‘Let’s start Program B.’ Program B is started and the environment is
helped.
Participants were asked (i) if the chairman intentionally helped the environment
and (ii) whether helping the environment was the chairman’s goal, a means to
achieve his goal or a side-effect of his action. Among the 25 participants, 20 (80%)
answered that helping the environment was a side-effect. Among the 20 participants
who answered that helping the environment was a side-effect, 16 (80%) answered
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that the chairman intentionally helped the environment.16 These results confirm
our prediction: a morally good side-effect becomes intentional when the agent has
a genuine desire that it occurs.
5. Empirical Predictions Related to Meaning 2
In this section, we present empirical predictions related to the use of Meaning 2
when ascriptions of intentionality bear on an outcome that we would expect the
agent to be reluctant to bring about.
5.1 Immunity to Changes in Objective Control
As Meaning 2 bears only upon the agent’s mental states, changes in objective
probabilities won’t have an effect on ascriptions of intentionality. Here is an
example drawn from the literature (Nadelhoffer, 2005) that parallels the examples
given for Meaning 1:
Nuclear (Bad): Fred has just been fired from the nuclear power plant. In a
desperate fit of anger, he decides to cause the reactor to meltdown. Fred knows
that the only way the reactor can be forced to melt down is by punching a
certain ten-digit code into a certain computer. Fred is alone in the control
room. Although he knows which computer to use, he has no idea what the
code is. Fred needs to think fast before the other employees return. Vividly
aware that the odds against typing in the correct code are astronomical, Fred
decides to give it a try. He punches in the first ten digits that come into his
head, in that order, believing of his doing so that it ‘might thereby’ cause
the reactor to meltdown. Amazingly, he punches in the correct code, thereby
causing a serious nuclear meltdown and killing thousands of people.
In this case, 83% of the participant said that Fred intentionally caused the explosion.
So, it seems that objective control really doesn’t matter if the outcome is one that
we would expect an agent to be reluctant to cause.
5.2 Sensitivity to Changes in Subjective Control under Particular
Conditions
The Nuclear (Bad) case could lead us to think that changes in subjective control
do not affect intentionality ratings for an outcome we would expect the agent to
16 It is very likely that most of these participants considered that the chairman deserved praise for
having helped the environment. So, these results seem to contradict Nadelhoffer’s claim that if
an agent is praiseworthy for having caused x, then x cannot be a side effect. For a discussion of
this problem, see Feltz, 2007 and Nadelhoffer, 2007.
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be reluctant to cause. But, in this particular case, the outcome is the agent’s goal,
so it is clear that the agent is not reluctant to bring it about. In fact, our account
predicts that decreases in subjective control will cause decreases in ascriptions of
intentionality when they cause people to consider the agent to be more reluctant to
cause the outcome. It is easier to believe someone did not want something bad to
happen when this person thought he had little chance to bring this outcome than
when he was sure it would happen.17
5.3 Sensitivity to Regret
The more the agent will express regret for having brought about the outcome, the
less the outcome will be judged intentional. This phenomenon has indeed been
observed by Sverdlik (2004), Sripada (2010) and Guglielmo and Malle (2010).
5.4 Sensitivity to the Value of the Goal: A Review of the Literature
Imagine a pair of cases in which the agent causes the same means or side-effect
he claims to be reluctant to cause. But, in the first case, he acts for the sake of a
relatively futile goal while, in the second case, he has a good reason for his action.
We predict that the intentionality rating will be higher in the first scenario, because,
as the agent acts for some unimportant reason, it shows that he is not really reluctant
to bring about the means or side-effect—at least, not as much as we would have
expected him to be. So, the intentionality of ‘bad’ outcomes can be reduced if the
agent acts on the basis of sufficiently ‘good’ reasons.
The fact that the better the goal, the less intentional is a bad means or a bad
side-effect can be found in multiple cases provided by the literature on the Knobe
Effect:
5.4.1 Phelan and Sarkissian, 2009. Drawing on Knobe’s original Thompson
Hill scenario (Knobe, 2003a), Phelan and Sarkissian designed the following pair of
cases:
Lieutenant (Important Goal): A lieutenant was talking with a sergeant. The
lieutenant gave the order: ‘Send your squad to the top of Thompson Hill’. The
sergeant said: ‘But if I send my squad to the top of Thompson Hill, we’ll be
moving the men directly into the enemy’s line of fire. Some of them will surely
be killed!’
The lieutenant answered: ‘Look, I know that they’ll be in the line of fire,
and I know that some of them will be killed. But I don’t care at all about what
17 That might be what is going on in Nadelhoffer’s C1, C2, C3 and C4 cases (described earlier).
A possibility is that people ascribe more reluctance to a hunter who thinks there’s only a small
chance of hitting the bird-watcher. A less interesting possibility is that people use the hunter’s
estimations as a clue to infer what are the real probabilities.
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happens to our soldiers. It’s imperative to the success of this campaign that we take
Thompson Hill.’
The squad was sent to the top of Thompson Hill. As expected, the soldiers
were moved into the enemy’s line of fire, and some of them were killed.
In the Unimportant Goal version, the case was modified so that the lieutenant has a
less good reason to send the soldiers to Thompson Hill (he just wants to take it). In
the Important version, 50% of participants answered that the lieutenant intentionally
caused the soldiers’ deaths, against 76% in the Unimportant version. We can explain
these results: since the lieutenant has a better reason to send his soldiers in the
Important case than in the Unimportant, it is reasonable to think that the lieutenant
cares more about his soldiers in the Important case and is thus more reluctant to
cause their deaths.
5.4.2 Nadelhoffer, 2006. In a 2006 study, Nadelhoffer used the following pair
of cases:
Officer: Imagine that a thief is driving a car full of recently stolen goods. While
he is waiting at a red light, a police officer comes up to the window of the
car while brandishing a gun. When he sees the officer, the thief speeds off
through the intersection. Amazingly, the officer manages to hold on to the side
of the car as it speeds off. The thief swerves in a zigzag fashion in the hope of
escaping—knowing full well that doing so places the officer in grave danger.
But the thief doesn’t care; he just wants to get away. Unfortunately for the
officer, the thief’s attempt to shake him off is successful. As a result, the officer
rolls into oncoming traffic and sustains fatal injuries. He dies minutes later.
Faced with this scenario, 37% of the participants said the thief intentionally brought
about the officer’s death. Another group of participants had to read the following
scenario:
Thief : Imagine that a man is waiting in his car at a red light. Suddenly, a car
thief approaches his window while brandishing a gun. When he sees the thief,
the driver panics and speeds off through the intersection. Amazingly, the thief
manages to hold on to the side of the car as it speeds off. The driver swerves
in a zigzag fashion in the hope of escaping—knowing full well that doing so
places the thief in grave danger. But the driver doesn’t care; he just wants to
get away. Unfortunately for the thief, the driver’s attempt to shake him off is
successful. As a result, the thief rolls into oncoming traffic and sustains fatal
injuries. He dies minutes later.
In this case, only 10% of the participants answered that the driver intentionally
brought about the car thief’s death. This difference is statistically significant. This
result can be explained by the mere fact that protecting one’s own good is a better
goal than stealing the property of others.
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5.4.3 Tannenbaum, Ditto and Pizarro. Tannenbaum, Ditto and Pizarro
(ms; see also Sargent et al., ms) used the two following scenarios:
Civilian casualties (American forces): Recently, an attack on Iraqi insurgence leaders
was conducted by American forces. The attack was strategically directed at a
few key rebel leaders that have been responsible for a number of recent attacks
on American forces, and it was strongly believed that eliminating these key
leaders would cause a significant reduction in the casualties of both American
military forces and American civilians working in Iraq. It was known that in
carrying out this attack there was a chance of Iraqi civilian casualties, although
these results were not intended and American forces sought to minimize the
death of civilians. The attack was successful—it eliminated all of the targets and
is certain to ensure the safety of American soldiers and civilians. Unfortunately,
a number of Iraqi civilians were killed and injured in the attack. American
representatives say that while this was not intended, it was necessary to take the
risk of civilian deaths in order to ensure the future safety of a larger number of
individuals. They also stated that sometimes it is necessary to allow the death of
innocent people in order to promote greater good.
Civilian casualties (Iraqi forces): Recently, an attack on American forces was
conducted by Iraqi insurgence leaders. The attack was strategically directed at
a few key military outfits that have been responsible for a number of recent
attacks against the Iraqi rebels, and it was strongly believed that eliminating
these key outfits would cause a significant reduction in the casualties of both
Iraqi military forces and Iraqi civilians. It was known that in carrying out
this attack there was a chance of American civilian casualties, although these
results were not intended and American forces sought to minimize the death of
civilians. The attack was successful—it eliminated all of the targets and is certain
to ensure the safety of Iraqi soldiers and civilians. Unfortunately, a number of
American civilians were killed and injured in the attack. Iraqi rebels say that
while this was not intended, it was necessary to take the risk of civilian deaths
in order to ensure the future safety of a larger number of individuals. They also
stated that sometimes it is necessary to allow the death of innocent people in
order to promote greater good.
Both scenarios were given to participants classified according to their political
orientation. The results show that the more conservative the participants were, the
more they tended to consider the death of American civilians (second scenario)
as more intentional than the death of Iraqi civilians (first scenario). On the
contrary, this difference tended to disappear when the participants were liberal.
From Knobe’s or Machery’s point of view, this can only be explained by claiming
that conservatives give less value to the life of an Iraqi civilian than to the life
of an American civilian, while liberals give the same value to both. But this is
not a very charitable interpretation of the data. According to us, the key change
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between these two scenarios is the goal that is aimed at by the agents. According
to conservatives, the goal of American forces is good, while the goal of Iraqi rebels
is not. Civilian casualties are thus considered as a sufficient reason for Iraqi rebels
to refrain from acting, but not for American forces. This is why killing civilians
is judged more intentional in the second scenario. From a liberal point of view,
the goal of American forces in Iraq is not so highly valued. So killing innocents
is a sufficient reason for both American Forces and Iraqi rebels to refrain from
acting. Thus, we can explain the asymmetry between conservatives and liberals
in these cases without postulating that conservatives give less worth to the lives
of non-American people. Moreover, our hypothesis fits the results obtained by
Tannenbaum, Ditto and Pizarro who found that the difference between liberals
and conservatives is mediated by the intention participants ascribed to the agents:
conservatives were far more likely than liberals to ascribe to Iraqi insurgence leaders
(than to American forces) a greater desire and intention to harm civilians.
5.5 Sensitivity to the Goodness of the Goal: Experiment 1
5.5.1 Material and Hypotheses. We designed four scenarios. The first two
scenarios (Greedy Chairman + Bad Side-effect and Greedy Chairman + Good Side-effect)
are similar to the original Harm and Help cases. The other two scenarios (Caring
Chairman + Bad Side-effect and Caring Chairman +Good Side-effect) form a similar pair,
except that the chairman’s goal is not to make money but to save his employee’s
jobs. Here is an example:
Caring Chairman + Bad Side-effect: The vice-president of a company went to the
chairman of the board and said: ‘We have designed a new program. It will help
us save our employees’ jobs and will harm the environment.’ The chairman of
the board answered: ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. All I
care about is saving my employees’ jobs. Let’s start the new program.’ They
started the new program and the environment was harmed.
These four cases allow us to systematically vary two factors: (i) the moral valence
of the SIDE-EFFECT (HARM, i.e. harming the environment, or HELP, i.e.
helping the environment) and (ii) the value of the chairman’s GOAL (GREEDY,
i.e. making more money, or CARING, i.e. saving his employees’ jobs). Our
hypothesis makes the two following predictions: (i) intentionality ratings will be
lower when the chairman’s goal is a ‘good reason’ and (ii) this effect will be limited
to cases in which the side-effect is ‘bad’ because Meaning 2 is used only in these
cases.
5.5.2 Participants and Ratings. 119 students participated in this experiment.
Each participant received only one case. Each participant had to answer the question
‘Did the chairman intentionally harm / help the environment?’ using a scale ranging
from −5 to 5 with −5 = ‘NO’ and 5 = ‘YES’.
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Helping the environment Harming the environment
Greedy Chairman −3.03 (0.61) 3.87 (0.38)
Chairman −3.36 (0.48) 2 (0.56)
Table 1 Means (and Standard Errors) of the participants’ answers for Experiment 1.
5.5.3 Results. Results are summarized in Table 1. A two-factor ANOVA
revealed a significant effect of SIDE-EFFECT, F(1,115)=143.2, p<.001, showing
that we were successful in replicating the Knobe effect for our two pairs of
scenarios, and a significant effect of GOAL, F(1,115)=4.9, p<.05. No significant
interaction effect was found, F(1,115)=2.2, p=.14. These results are coherent with
our first hypothesis.
We also made the prediction that the difference in the ratings of intentionality
between the Caring Chairman and the Greedy Chairman will be greater in the
case of bad side-effects. We compared the response of the participants for the two
scenarios involving a bad side-effect (Caring Chairman + Bad Side-Effect and Greedy
Chairman + Bad Side-Effect) using a two-tailed t-test. We found that the difference
was significant, N=58, t=−2.8, df=47.6, p<.01. No significant difference was
found for the comparison between the two scenarios involving a good side-effect
(Caring Chairman + Good Side-Effect and Greedy Chairman + Good Side-Effect).
5.6 Sensitivity to the Goodness of the Goal: Experiment 2
5.6.1 Material and Hypotheses. In this experiment, we tried to replicate the
results of the previous experiment in a context that would elicit probabilistic, i.e.
descriptive (or non-moral) expectations, rather than normative expectations (as
in e.g. moral cases). We designed six scenarios that varied along the same two
factors: the importance of the GOAL, and the goodness of the SIDE-EFFECT.
In each scenario, the main character was a doctor. His goal could be Important
(to cure a deadly disease) or Unimportant (to remove an ugly spot from a patient’s
face). In each scenario, the doctor proposed an effective treatment that had various
side-effects. This side-effect could be Good (increasing the patient’s memory),
Neutral (imperceptibly modifying the patient’s blood pressure) or Bad (decreasing
the patient’s visual acuity). In each of these side-effects, only the patient himself
suffers (or benefits) from his decision. Here is an example:
Unimportant Goal + Bad Side-effect: A patient with a skin disease goes to his
doctor. The doctor proposes him a new treatment: ‘As you already know, this
spot will remain on your nose for the rest of your life. But, if I give you this
new treatment, it is very likely that this spot will disappear and that your sight
will be badly impaired.’ The patient answers: ‘I don’t care about my sight. All
I want is to get rid of this spot. Give me the treatment.’ The treatment is given
to the patient, whose sight is badly impaired.’
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Our two hypotheses were the same as in the previous experiment.
5.6.2 Participants and Rating. 200 students participated in this experiment.
Each participant received only one version of the scenario. Each participant had to
answer the question ‘Did the patient intentionally increase his memory / modify
his blood pressure / decrease his sight?’ using a scale ranging from −5 to 5 with −5
= NO and 5 = YES. Then came a second question in the form of a sentence to
complete: ‘In itself, decreasing his sight / modifying his blood pressure / increasing
his memory seems to you to be something . . . ’, followed by a scale ranging from −5
to 5 with the following indications: −5 = UNDESIRABLE, 0 = INDIFFERENT,
5 = DESIRABLE
5.6.3 Results. The second question (bearing on the desirability of the side-
effect) was asked in order to verify whether our side-effects corresponded to our
classification (Bad / Neutral / Good). Results are summarized in Table 2.
The order of the ratings was the one we expected (Bad < Neutral < Good).
Nevertheless, the Neutral side-effect seemed to have been considered rather
as a mildly bad side-effect. Table 3 sums up the results for the intentionality
question.
A two-factor ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Side-Effect, F(2,194)=18.5,
p<.001, and a significant effect of Goal, F(1,194)=5.8, p<.05. No significant
interaction effect was found, F(2,194)=0.2, p=.74. Once again, as predicted by our
hypothesis, the side-effect is considered to be more intentional when the goal is
unimportant. Our hypothesis also predicted that this difference would be greater
when the side-effect is really bad, given that a good side-effect or a neutral side-effect
are never a good reason not to act, whatever the importance of the goal, but we
failed to observe an interaction effect. Nevertheless, for the three SIDE-EFFECT
conditions, we compared the responses in the Important Goal and the Unimportant
Bad Neutral Good
−3.85 −1.97 3.85
Table 2 Means of the participants’ answers to the desirability question in Experiment 2.
Good Neutral Bad
Unimportant Goal −1.33 (0.69) 1.45 (0.49) 2.25 (0.44)
Important Goal −1.93 (0.57) 0.20 (0.67) 0.95 (0.49)
Table 3 Means (and Standard Errors) of the participants’ answers to the intentionality question in
Experiment 2.
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Goal conditions, using a one-tailed t-test, with the hypothesis that the mean will
be greater in the Unimportant Goal condition. We obtained a significant difference
in the Bad Side-Effect condition (N=80, t=2, df=77, p<.05), only a marginally
significant difference in the Neutral Side-Effect condition (N=60, t=1.5, df=52,
p<.10) and no significant difference in the Good Side-Effect condition. Though not
enough to warrant our prediction, these results are encouraging for future empirical
investigations of the interaction between the importance of goal and the valence of
the side-effect.
6. Empirical Predictions Related to Meaning 3
In this section, we present empirical predictions related to the use of Meaning
3, which is elicited when ascriptions of intentionality bear on an outcome whose
achievement requires either control or luck and when Meaning 1 or 2 is not already
salient.
6.1 Immunity to Subjective Control
We assume that subjective probabilities won’t have an effect on ascriptions of
intentionality when Meaning 3 is used. This assumption is supported by the Bowl
case, described earlier. In this case, Earl has a great objective control upon his action
(he is a skillful bowler) but a very low subjective control (he believes that it is very
unlikely that he will succeed in knocking down the pins). Still, most participants
rate his action as intentional.
6.2 Sensitivity to Changes in Objective Control
When Meaning 3 is preferentially elicited, an outcome performed by an agent who
exerts low objective control upon his action and succeeds by sheer luck should have
very low intentionality ratings. This prediction is consistent with data we already
mentioned, such as the Bull’s-eye (No-Skill) cases.
6.3 Changing Answers by Making Some Elements More Salient
Our theory also makes the prediction that it is possible to change participants’
answers to cases similar to the Bull’s-eye and the Aunt cases by making some
elements (and therefore a certain meaning) more salient. For example, in Knobe’s
Bull’s-eye (No-Skill) case, there are two different elements: the fact that the agent
wants to hit the bull’s-eye (Meaning 1) and the fact that hitting the bull’s-eye
requires skill (Meaning 3). Knobe’s results suggest that the second element is more
salient than the first and that most participants use Meaning 3. But making the first
element more salient could modify these results. Sripada (2010) gave participants a
modified version of this case in which they were told that Jake wants to be a police
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
On Doing Things Intentionally 403
Skill No-Skill
‘kill his aunt’ 100% 100%
‘shoot his aunt’ 90% 84%
‘hit his aunt’s heart’ 95% 49%
Table 4 Results from Malle, 2006.
officer more than anything else, that the rifle contest is part of the competition to
enter the police academy and that Jack needs to hit the bull’s-eye for in order to
win the contest. In this version, 90% of participants answered that Jack intentionally
hit the bull’s-eye.
Another solution is to modify the description of the outcome in the questionnaire.
We can imagine that one and the same outcome can be described in different terms,
and that some will preferentially elicit a certain meaning. For example, Malle (2006)
used variations of Knobe’s Aunt cases in which only the question varied. Three
questions were used: ‘Did Jake intentionally kill his aunt?’; ‘Did Jake intentionally
shoot his aunt?’; and ‘Did Jake intentionally hit his aunt’s heart?’ The results are
presented in Table 4.
As we can see, the difference between the Skill and the No-Skill conditions
is absent when the question bears on ‘kill his aunt’ but is present when it bears
on ‘hit his aunt’s heart’. This can be explained by the fact that the description
‘kill’ stresses the immoral side of Jake’s action (eliciting Meaning 2), while the
description ‘hit his aunt’s heart’ stresses the fact that Jake’s action required skills
(eliciting Meaning 3).
Here is another example drawn from Nadelhoffer, 2006c:
Dice (Roll): Brown is playing a simple game of dice. The game requires that
Brown roll a six to win. So, hoping to get a six, Brown throws a die onto the
table. Unluckily for the other players, the die lands six-up and Brown wins the
game. Question: Did Brown intentionally roll a six?
Dice (Win): Brown is playing a simple game of dice. The game requires that
Brown roll a six to win. So, hoping to get a six, Brown throws a die onto the
table. Unluckily for the other players, the die lands six-up and Brown wins the
game. Question: Did Brown intentionally win the game?
Faced with the first scenario, only 10% of participants answered that Brown
intentionally rolled a six (a neutral event). Faced with the second case, 62.5% of
participants answered that Brown intentionally won the game (a non-morally good
event that we would expect the agent to desire). How can we account for this
difference? Our hypothesis is that asking whether ‘Brown intentionally won the
game’ redirects attention to Brown’s desire to win the game (eliciting Meaning 1)
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whereas asking whether ‘Brown intentionally rolled a six’ redirects attention to the
fact that winning the game requires luck (eliciting Meaning 3).18
7. Other Empirical Data
Finally, in this section, we examine some empirical data that are not related to any
particular meaning and try to account for them.
7.1 The Nazi Law Cases
Knobe (2007) designed a puzzling pair of cases. Here is the first case:
Nazi Law (Violation): In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the ‘racial
identification law.’ The purpose of the law was to help identify people of
certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps.
Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to
make certain organizational changes. The Vice-President of the corporation
said: ‘By making those changes, you’ll definitely be increasing our profits. But
you’ll also be violating the requirements of the racial identification law.’ The
CEO said: ‘Look, I know that I’ll be violating the requirements of the law, but
I don’t care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I
can. Let’s make those organizational changes!’ As soon as the CEO gave this
order, the corporation began making the organizational changes.
In the Fulfillment case, all occurrences of ‘violating’ were replaced by ‘fulfilling.’
In the Violation case, 81% of participants said the CEO intentionally violated the
requirements of the law, while only 30% of participants said he intentionally fulfilled
the requirements of the law in the Fulfillment case. At first sight, it seems as if our
account cannot explain this asymmetry, since, from a normative point of view,
we would expect the CEO to have the desire to violate the (Nazi) law and to be
reluctant to fulfill its requirements.
However, these normative considerations turn out not to be very salient to
participants. In Knobe’s original experiments, participants had to judge how much
blame or praise the CEO deserved, using a scale from −3 (‘a lot of blame’) to
3 (‘a lot of praise’), with the 0 point marked ‘no blame or praise’. The mean
answer was −1.7 in the Fulfillment case and −0.9 in the Violation case, a difference
that wasn’t significant. Even when asked how much blame or praise the CEO
18 This strongly suggests the following rule:
Principle of the priority of descriptive expectations over possibilities of failure: ceteris paribus, descriptive
expectations are more salient than possibilities of failure
Nevertheless, things seem to go in the exact opposite directions in the Bull’s-Eye (No Skill)
case. As suggested by Sripada’s version of this case, it seems that there is no straightforward
hierarchy in salience between descriptive expectations and possibilities of failure. It all depends
on which is the more salient in a given context.
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would have deserved if he had been specifically trying to violate the law, the mean
answer was 0.3, showing that participants didn’t consider the violation of the law
as morally good or bad, but rather as morally neutral. These results suggest that, in
the Violation case, there is no salient normative expectation. But, on the contrary,
descriptive expectations are multiple. First, there is the descriptive expectation that
the CEO will be reluctant to violate the law, because it will get him into trouble.
Furthermore, there is a non-zero chance that he is a Nazi, and, if he is, then he is
likely to have the desire that the law be respected. Thus, the CEO is descriptively
expected to be significantly more reluctant to violate the law than to have the
desire to do so, while there is no strong normative expectation. So, Meaning
2 is preferentially activated and, because the CEO doesn’t care, we consider his
violating the law as intentional.
In the Fulfillment case, the same reasons generate a salient descriptive expectation:
we expect a reasonable man to prefer not to get into trouble with the Nazi
authorities, for his own sake, and thus to have the desire to fulfill the requirements
of the law. Surely, there is also the normative expectation that the agent will not
have the desire to fulfill the law, but we have seen that this expectation is too weak
to generate a normative expectation that the agent will have the desire not to fulfill
the law (that is: to violate it). So, in the Fulfillment case, Meaning 1 is the most
salient, and because the CEO does not have the desire to fulfill the requirements of
the law, most participants consider its action as non-intentional.
7.2 Means are More Intentional than Side-Effects
Overall, means are judged more intentional than side-effects, even if, as we already
mentioned, an asymmetry similar to the Knobe Effect can be found at the level of
means (Cova and Naar, forthcoming a). How can we account for this difference?
The fact is that Meaning 1 and Meaning 2 are sensitive to how strong the agent’s
desire about the occurrence of an event is: the more the agent desires an event to
occur, the more intentional his bringing it about will be. Now, when an event is
a means rather than a side-effect, it is more strongly desired, because in addition
to the intrinsic desirability of the outcome, the means can also be the object of an
instrumental desire. If and when it is, the strength of the instrumental desire for
the means will depend on the strength of the desire for the goal. So, because (i)
means are the objects of stronger desires than are side-effects (by definition) and
(ii) the stronger the desire for an event, the more the causation of the event is
judged intentional, according to Meanings 1 and 2, means will be considered more
intentional than side-effects.
8. Conclusion: Implications for Folk Psychology
The Knobe and Skill Effects have been taken by many as a proof that folk psychology
is deeply influenced by moral considerations. Some have taken this influence to be
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a bias (Nadelhoffer, 2006) while others, such as Knobe, have concluded that the
purpose of folk psychology is not only to provide a quasi ‘scientific’ description of
the world but that it also has an evaluative function (Knobe, 2006, 2010). Some have
rejected this view, arguing that these effects could be explained without postulating
an impact of moral considerations on ascriptions of mental states (Machery, 2008;
Sripada, 2010).
Where do our hypotheses stand in this debate? We grant that moral considerations
and normative expectations do influence participants’ answers. However, we do not
think that this proves that moral considerations have an impact on folk psychology
and mental state attributions. Moral considerations have an impact on what speakers
mean when they use the English adverb ‘intentionally’, i.e. on the choice of the
concept that they link to this particular word. In the experiments under discussion,
the task of a participant is to judge whether an agent whose action is described in
a scenario caused an effect intentionally. Processing information about the agent’s
attitudes conveyed by the scenario is likely to cause a participant to produce a moral
evaluation of the agent, which in turn will affect the participant’s selection of a
particular meaning of the adverb ‘intentionally’. But it is one thing to account for
the conditions under which English speakers are willing to use this adverb when
asked to judge whether the agent caused some effect intentionally. Another thing
is the speaker’s ability to ascribe beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions to the
agent. For example, two persons may share the very same beliefs about an agent’s
mental states, objective control over his action in the Aunt (No-Skill) case, but they
could still give very different answers to the question ‘did Jake intentionally kill his
aunt?’ One could be using Meaning 2, the other Meaning 3. This clearly shows
that a speaker’s mindreading ability (i.e. her ability to ascribe beliefs, desires and
intentions to an agent) is one of the necessary conditions explaining her selection
of one or another meaning of the English adverb ‘intentionally’ in response to the
question. But it is far from being sufficient. The fact that the moral evaluation
of the agent affects the selection of one of the two meanings of ‘intentionally’
fails to establish that the speaker’s mindreading ability itself is shaped by moral
considerations.
So, according to our theory, moral considerations may play a role at a lin-
guistic, expressive level, but not at the level of folk psychological attribution
of mental states to others. It would be a mistake not to recognize the distinc-
tion between how people think (about others’ thoughts) and how they verbally
report their thoughts (about others’ thoughts) (Cova, Dupoux and Jacob, 2010;
Egre´, 2010).
If our hypothesis is correct, then this also means that there is not a single,
irreducible, folk psychological concept of intentional action. We have concepts
of pro-attitudes (e.g. desires), beliefs and goal-directed actions. Some combinations
of these concepts can be expressed using the word ‘intentionally’ in some particular
contexts. But studying the use of the word ‘intentionally’ with the hope of directly
probing a key component of our folk psychology is highly problematic. According
to our account, studying the Knobe Effect can teach us a lot about our linguistic use
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of the word ‘intentionally’ and indirectly, but not directly, about theory-of-mind
and/or folk psychology.
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